Lessons from the crisis

從危機中獲得的教訓

 

Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB
at the European American Press Club, Paris, 3 December 2010

歐洲中央銀行總裁Jean-Claude Trichet201012 3 日在巴黎的「駐歐洲的美國新聞媒體俱樂部」發表的演講

 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

各位女士和先生,

 

I would like to start by thanking the organisers for inviting me to share with you my thoughts on the economic and financial crisis. The crisis is not yet over, but we should certainly start drawing lessons and we should certainly start implementing them.  

首先,我想要感謝主辦單位邀請我與你們分享我對經濟和金融危機的一些想法。危機尚未結束,但是我們確實應該要開始擷取教訓,我們也確實應該要開始採行學到的教訓。

 

Times are challenging, and Europes citizens expect all policy-makers to be up to the responsibilities of fulfilling their respective mandates. 

時間很緊迫,且歐洲民眾期待所有的政策制訂者盡到他們應盡的責任。

 

As far as the European Central Bank (ECB) is concerned, I recall that we were among the first central banks in the world to react to the outbreak of the financial turmoil back in August 2007. Since then, we have continued to act with a posture that I have called credible alertness. This posture includes both standard monetary policy, which is implemented through interest rate changes, and non-standard policies, which are implemented, in essence, through special liquidity operations and interventions in some bond markets including covered bonds. 

就歐洲中央銀行而言,我記得我們是20078月金融動盪爆發後,世界上最先採取應變行動的中央銀行之一。此後,我們採取我所稱的「可信賴的警覺態度」繼續行動,包括標準的貨幣政策(透過調整利率來執行),和非標準的政策(本質上,透過專案的流動性操作和在一些債券市場進行干預來執行,包括擔保債券)兩者。

 

It is my opinion that the ECBs Governing Council has demonstrated a strong ability to keep the European monetary vessel on course through the waves of a financial storm that has often been defined as the most serious since the Great Depression. Throughout the global crisis, resolute action by policy-makers has helped to avoid a repeat of the economic policy disasters of the 1930s and to foster close cooperation around the world, including among central banks.

我認為歐洲中央銀行理事會已經展現強大的能力,維持歐洲貨幣之船於正確航道,通過金融風暴的驚濤駭浪。這場金融風暴時常被定義為「經濟大恐慌」以來最嚴重者。在全球性危機的發展過程中,政策制訂者果決的行動,有助於避免重演1930年代的經濟政策災難,促進全球的密切合作,包括中央銀行間的合作。

 

But recent developments in European sovereign debt markets remind us that the crisis is not yet over. They also remind us that Economic and Monetary Union rests on two pillars: an Economic pillar and a Monetary pillar.

但是最近歐洲政府債券市場的發展,提醒我們危機尚未結束。它們也提醒我們,「經濟和貨幣聯盟」仰賴二個支柱:「經濟支柱」和「貨幣支柱」。

 

The Monetary pillar obviously refers to the ECB, its mandate and its independence. The Economic pillar comprises the fiscal regime enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact; the national frameworks of economic policy; and the system of mutual surveillance.

「貨幣支柱」顯然指歐洲中央銀行及其任務和獨立性。「經濟支柱」則包含「穩定和成長協定」所銘記的財政制度;各國的經濟政策架構;以及互相監視系統。

 

It is very important to understand and it has perhaps not yet been sufficiently understood that the developments we are currently witnessing in Europes economy have to do with the Economic functions of Economic and Monetary Union. They have essentially three origins: unsound fiscal policies in a number of Member States; inappropriate macroeconomic policies in a number of Member States; and overall an inadequate system of surveillance by all Member States. 

非常重要的是,我們要了解(但也許尚未被充份地了解):我們現在所目睹的歐洲經濟的發展,與「經濟和貨幣聯盟」的「經濟」層面有關。本質上它們的源頭有三:許多會員國的財政政策不健全;許多會員國的總體經濟政策不適當;以及整體而言,全體會員國的監視系統不適足。

 

This is the triangle that provides the perimeter of the current situation. 

這就是現時情況所呈現出來的三角形外貌。

The solution to these three elements involves both the responsibility of national fiscal authorities in ensuring sound fiscal policies in each and every member state and the ability of Europes policy-makers to design and implement a truly effective system of macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance. 

對這三個層面的解決辦法涉及兩者,包括每一個會員國財政主管當局確保財政政策健全的職責,以及歐盟的政策制訂者設計並推行真正有效的總體經濟和財政監視系統的能力。

 

Today I would like to start by discussing the two pillars of Economic and Monetary Union. Then I will briefly describe how the ECB has responded to the crisis. And finally, I will touch on the current economic situation and conclude with the key challenges that lie ahead of us in achieving effective economic governance in Europe.

今天我想要從討論「經濟和貨幣聯盟」的二個支柱開始,然後簡短地描述歐洲中央銀行如何因應危機。最後,我將會觸及現在的經濟情況,並以在歐盟達成有效的經濟治理方面我們即將面臨的主要挑戰作為總結。

 

The Monetary pillar: Price stability in the euro area

「貨幣」支柱:歐元區的物價穩定

 

The Treaty assigns to the ECB direct responsibility for maintaining price stability. From the outset the ECB has set itself a very clear numerical benchmark, which is a public and transparent measure. The ECBs Governing Council has defined price stability to be an annual rate of inflation in the euro area of below 2%, but close to 2%, over the medium term. 

歐盟條約指派歐洲中央銀行維持物價穩定的直接職責。從最開始,歐洲中央銀行就已經為本身設定一個非常清楚的數字基準,這是一個公開且透明的衡量方法。歐洲中央銀行理事會將物價穩定定義為在中期間歐元區物價年增率低於但接近2%

 

We now have almost 12 years of experience with the euro enough time to judge whether the ECB has been successful in delivering its mandate. Over these 12 years, the average annual inflation rate in the euro area has been 1.97%. We have achieved price stability in the euro area over what has already been quite a long horizon. It is the best result of any of the larger countries in the euro area for at least 50 years.

我們現在差不多有12 年的歐元經驗 -- 時間足以判斷歐洲中央銀行有否成功地執行它的職務。在這12 年間,歐元區物價年增率平均為1.97%。我們已經在歐元區達成物價穩定有相當長的一段時間。它至少是近50年來歐元區任何比較大的國家的最好結果。

 

The conditions for achieving price stability have not always been easy, and the ECBs Governing Council has had to face a number of economic and political shocks since we began, in 1999, with a new institution, a new currency and a new framework for monetary policy-making.

達成物價穩定的環境不一定總是容易的,而且自1999年我們開創以來,歐洲中央銀行理事會已經以一個新的機構、新的貨幣、和新的貨幣政策制訂架構,面對了許多的經濟和政治衝擊。

 

Over the years we have had to cope with highly volatile developments in many components of the consumption basket including oil prices in the vicinity of $150 per barrel considerable variations in exchange rates, the bursting of the internet bubble and the fallout of the terrorist attacks on the US, to name but a few. Hence, the track record, with 12 years of price stability, is worthy of note. 

這些年來,我們必須因應消費籃中許多高度不安定的成份。隨便列舉一些,包括油價接近150美元一桶、相當大的匯率變動、美國網際網路泡沫的破滅和恐怖攻擊的影響。因此,12年的物價穩定這項紀錄值得一提。

 

For France, the inflation rate has been even lower than the average in the euro area over the past 12 years: 1.8% per year on average from 1999 to October 2010. This is even slightly lower than, but very close to, the average rate of inflation in France in the 1990s prior to the introduction of the euro, which was 2.0%. In the 1980s, it was 7.4% and in the 1970s 8.8%.

就法國而言,在過去 12 年間物價膨脹率甚至比歐元區的平均數低:從1999年至201010月平均每年1.8%。這甚至稍微低於但非常接近在歐元問世之前1990年代法國的平均物價年增率2.0%。在1980 年代則為7.4%1970 年代為8.8%

 

The credibility of the euro, as measured by its ability to preserve purchasing power, is better than its legacy currencies have been over the last 50 years.

歐元的可信賴度,以其保持購買力的能力來衡量,比過去50年舊有的各種貨幣好。

 

The Economic pillar: sound and sustainable fiscal policy

「經濟」支柱:健全且可持續的財政政策

 

The Economic pillar of Economic and Monetary Union rests on two ideas. First, fiscal policies must align with the requirements laid out in the Stability and Growth Pact. Second macroeconomic policies must be aligned with the general rules governing the participation in a monetary union that is based on price stability. 

「經濟和貨幣聯盟」的經濟支柱依靠二個想法。首先,財政政策必須符合「穩定和成長協定」所列舉的要件。其次,總體經濟政策必須符合參加貨幣聯盟的一般規則,而以物價穩定為基礎。

 

I want to be candid with you today. The roots of the sovereign debt tensions we face today lie in the neglect of the rules for fiscal discipline that the founding fathers of Economic and Monetary Union laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. 

今天我要坦白地跟你們說,我們今天所面對的政府債券緊張情勢,其根源為忽視了「經濟和貨幣聯盟」的建立者在馬斯垂克條約所立下的財政紀律規則。

 

We know that for several years, fiscal policies in many European countries have breached both the letter and the spirit of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Pact calls for budgets that are close to balance or in surplus over the cycle, deficits below 3% of GDP and a public debt level of below 60% of GDP. When a few years ago it became clear that in some countries fiscal policies would not be able to meet the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, it was not the policies that were changed but the Pact. This was clearly a mistake.

我們知道,多年來許多歐盟國家的財政政策違反「穩定和成長協定」的條文和精神。「協定」要求在一個經濟循環期間,預算要接近平衡或有剩餘;財政赤字低於國內生產毛額的3%;和政府債務水準低於國內生產毛額的60%。幾年前,當明瞭有些國家財政政策不能符合「穩定和成長協定」的規則時,修改的竟然不是政策,而是「協定」,這顯然是一個錯誤。

 

In 2004 and 2005, several governments, including the government of the larger Member States, were actively trying to dismantle the Stability and Growth Pact. It was a very fierce battle at the time, and the ECB publicly voiced its grave concerns. 

2004年和2005年,許多政府(包括比較大會員國的政府)積極地試圖廢除「穩定和成長協定」。當時,那是一場非常激烈的戰爭,歐洲中央銀行公開宣示它的嚴重關切。

 

The second area of policy slippage concerns macroeconomic policies. In a monetary union, national developments in prices and costs have to take account of the fact that the union is a union of monetary stability. Therefore, national price and costs developments significantly higher than the union average entail significant losses over time in competitiveness. Competitiveness losses cannot be sustained forever, and sooner or later adjustments in unsustainable economic policies have to be made. Fiscal and structural policies need to keep domestic demand in line with rates of sustainable growth and price stability. Otherwise, booms and busts may prevail. 

發生閃失的第二個政策領域與總體經濟政策有關。在一個貨幣聯盟中,各國的物價和成本變動,必須考慮到這個聯盟是一個貨幣穩定聯盟這項事實。因此,一國的物價和成本變動高出聯盟的平均數時,隨著時間經過,會帶來競爭力的明顯流失。競爭力的流失不能夠永遠地持續下去,未能持續的經濟政策遲早必須作調整。財政和經濟結構政策需要根據可持續的經濟成長率和物價穩定,維持國內需求於能夠配合的水準。否則,繁榮與衰退交替的景氣循環可能繼續存在。

 

Both fiscal and macroeconomic policies are monitored by the peers, supported mainly by the European Commission. The Eurogroup and Ecofin meetings of finance ministers are the fora for such peer monitoring. Of course, effective monitoring requires adherence by members to the policy framework, it requires peer pressure and consequences to deal with deviant behaviour, and it requires reliable statistics. 

財政和總體經濟政策兩者都要受同儕監視,主要由歐盟委員會支援。「歐元集團財政部長會議」和「財經部長理事會」的財政部長會議是該類同儕監視的場所。當然,有效的監視需要各會員國遵守政策架構;需要同儕的壓力並處罰越軌行為;以及需要可靠的統計。

 

Reinforcing economic governance is essential. Fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance have fallen short of the requirements of a monetary union. Fiscal policy conduct has quite often not been in line with the Pact, macroeconomic policies have been too loose, and peer pressure has overall been weak. These problems were visible well before the financial crisis, but the crisis has certainly taught us that there is no excuse for those that have not lived up fully to their responsibilities.

加強經濟治理是必要的。對財政和總體經濟的監控並未達到貨幣聯盟的需求。財政政策行為時常不符合「協定」,總體經濟政策太鬆散,以及整體而言,同儕壓力微弱不彰。這些問題早在金融危機發生之前就看得見,而這次危機的確給了我們教訓,那些沒有切實履行責任者完全沒有藉口。

 

I will come back the institutional remedies the ECB thinks are necessary to deal with these issues in a moment. But first let me turn directly to the crisis and illustrate how the ECB operational framework helped us in tackling the challenges that the financial turmoil posed for monetary policy. 

稍待片刻我將會回過頭來討論歐洲中央銀行認為處理這些問題所需的制度面補救方法。但是首先讓我直接轉到這次危機的話題,並且舉例說明歐洲中央銀行的作業架構如何幫助我們處理金融動盪為貨幣政策所帶來的各項挑戰。

 

The financial crisis and the policy responses

金融危機和政策反應

 

It is fair to say that more than three years since the crisis began in the summer of 2007, there is a broad agreement on the role of imprudent practices in the financial sector. Over the few years preceding the crisis, the focus of finance moved towards the creation of financial risk, and away from the sound management and insurance of economic risks, typically borne by entrepreneurs that are willing to take risk and need financing. 

公平地說,自從2007年夏危機發生三年多以來,大家對金融業部門的不審慎作業實務所扮演的角色,大致有共同的看法。危機發生前數年間,金融界的焦點朝向財務風險的創造,而遠離對各項經濟風險的健全管理和保險,經濟風險通常由願意冒險且需要融資的企業家承擔。

 

Financial risk is different from economic risk. It entails a deliberate exposure to expected asset price changes. Inasmuch as it supports price discovery, financial risk-taking contributes to efficient allocation of resources in market economies. It can at times become toxic when it is based on wrong perceptions of risk. 

財務風險與經濟風險不同,它帶來對預期資產價格變化的刻意曝險。只要它能支援價格發現機能,就市場經濟而言,財務風險承擔有助於提升資源配置效率。但當它立基於對風險的錯誤認知時,有時可能變成有害的。

 

The events that unfolded after 15 September 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, threatened to create severe damages for borrowers and for the broader economy. Banks and other financial intermediaries shed risky and illiquid investments and rushed to liquidity, banks intermediation was reduced and loans to companies were curtailed. If not tackled promptly, such developments could eventually have led to financial meltdown.

2008915日「雷曼兄弟公司」申請破產之後引發的事件,威脅到借款人和更廣大的經濟體系,可能產生嚴重傷害。銀行和其他金融中介機構拋售高風險和缺乏流動性的投資資產,而搶進流動資產。各銀行減少中介活動,對企業的放款被縮減。如果不迅速處理,這樣的發展最後可能導致金融災難。

 

As I mentioned, the ECB was among the first central banks to recognise the severity of the situation as early as August 2007, when the turmoil began and prompted our first reaction to the lack of liquidity in the money market. As the failure of Lehman precipitated the acute phase of the crisis, the ECB acted decisively again, taking several measures to protect against a disorderly correction in credit and liquidity conditions for the euro area. Our approach of enhanced credit support helped restoring a more normal transmission of our monetary policy stance and ensuring that banks could maintain their crucial role in financing the real economy. The ECB also engaged in a covered bond purchase programme worth 60 billion throughout the euro area. The covered bond market is important in our economy and it was vital to re-start and support its functioning.

如同前述,歐洲中央銀行是早在20078月就最先察覺情況嚴重性的中央銀行之一,當時開始出現動盪,引起我們對金融市場的流動性缺乏作出第一次反應。在「雷曼兄弟公司」倒閉引發危機的危急階段時,歐洲中央銀行再次果斷行動,採取許多措施對抗歐元區的授信和流動性狀況的無秩序市場修正。我們採行提高融資支援的方法,有助於使我們的貨幣政策傳遞效果恢復比較正常的運作,並確保銀行可以在對實質經濟提供融資方面,保持它們的關鍵性角色。歐洲中央銀行也從事擔保債券方案,全歐元區總值6百億歐元。擔保債券市場在我們的經濟體系中很重要,重新啟動並支援其運作,至為重要。

 

In May 2010 increasing market concerns about the sustainability of public finances led to severe tensions in certain market segments, which were hampering the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and thereby the effective conduct of our efforts to maintain price stability. Once more the ECB decided on appropriate measures.

20105月市場對政府財政的憂慮增加,導致某些市場部門出現嚴重的緊張情勢,阻礙貨幣政策的傳遞機制,以及我們維持物價穩定努力的有效執行。再一次,歐洲中央銀行決定採取適當的措施。

 

Private financial intermediation was again threatened. With the rapid increase in secured interbank lending in the euro area in recent years, the impact on money markets of developments in government bond markets has grown substantially. Government bonds have traditionally been an important element in the monetary policy transmission process because they serve as a benchmark for the pricing of other financial contracts and fixed-income securities. 

民間的金融中介機制再次受到威脅。隨著近幾年來歐元區跨行擔保拆借的快速增加,政府債券市場的變化對貨幣市場的衝擊大幅增加。傳統以來,政府債券在貨幣政策傳遞過程中是一項重要的元素,因為它們成為其他金融契約和固定收益證券訂價的指標。

 

They have also emerged as a prime source of collateral in interbank lending. As a result abrupt changes in the value or availability of these securities can imply a sharp deterioration in banks funding conditions with adverse effects on both the supply of bank loans to the real economy and their prices. 

它們也成為跨行拆借的主要擔保品來源。因此,這類證券的價值或取得來源方面突然改變,可能隱含各銀行的資金來源情況的急遽惡化 – 此對銀行對實質經濟部門放款的供給及其價格兩者都會有不利影響。

 

All our non-standard measures help to restore a more normal monetary policy transmission mechanism, which is necessary to fulfil our primary mandate of maintaining price stability in the medium term. 

我們所採行的非傳統措施,有助於恢復一個比較正常化的貨幣政策傳遞機制,此對我們維持中期間物價穩定的主要任務的達成,有其必要。

 

In recent weeks, the tensions associated with the Irish fiscal problems and the reorganisation of its banking sector have led to renewed bouts of high volatility in financial markets. More than ever it is important that governments step up consolidation in way that is credible and lays the foundation for sustainable long-term growth. There is a clear need to strengthen public confidence in the capacity of governments to return to sustainable public finances and thus support sustainable growth over the medium term. To this end, it is essential that countries pursue credible multi-year consolidation plans and fully implement the planned consolidation measures. Positive fiscal developments that may emerge, reflecting factors such as a more favourable than expected economic environment, should be exploited to make faster progress with fiscal consolidation. 

近幾星期來,愛爾蘭財政問題和銀行業部門改組引起的緊張情勢,已經導致金融市場再度出現大幅震盪。各國政府應該以讓人信賴的方式加緊財政鞏固措施,並且為可持續的長期成長奠定基礎,這些工作比平常更為重要。各國政府顯然需要加強社會大眾信心,讓人相信它有能力將財政恢復至可持續狀態,藉此支援中期間可持續的成長。為達此目的,各國有必要追求可信賴的跨多年度財政鞏固計畫,並充分執行計劃內的鞏固措施。可能浮現的財政正向發展(反映諸如比預期有利的經濟環境等因素),應該被利用來加快財政鞏固措施的進度。

 

Europes economy: the current situation and the challenges ahead

歐盟經濟:現況和未來挑戰

 

Let me come to the third and final part of my remarks: what are the lessons we have learned from these events? 

讓我進入我的發言的第三部份,也是最後部份:我們從這些事件學習到什麼教訓?

 

First, our monetary policy strategy has proved to be effective. The quantitative definition of price stability and the medium-term orientation significantly reduce the likelihood of either deflation or inflation scares. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations throughout a time of crisis meant that we could maintain the rate on our refinancing operations at positive levels without having the materialisation of a deflationary risk or of an inflationary threat. 

首先,證明我們的貨幣政策策略是有效的。量化的物價穩定定義和中期間導向,顯著地減少物價緊縮或物價膨脹的恐懼。堅定地維繫物價預期心理(在危機發生期間),意謂我們可以維持我們的轉融通操作利率於正值水準,物價緊縮風險或物價膨脹威脅不會實現。

 

Europes leaders should recognise that our economic model is in need of a considerable strengthening, especially our system of economic governance. In this respect, the Governing Council of the ECB considers that the proposals put forward by the Commission and the European Council Task Force do not yet represent the quantum leap in economic governance that is needed to be fully commensurate with the monetary union we have created.

歐盟的領導人們應該瞭解,我們的經濟模型需要相當程度的加強,尤其我們的經濟治理制度。在這方面,歐洲中央銀行理事會認為,歐盟委員會和歐盟理事會工作小組提出的建議案,仍然不能代表完全符合我們所創造的貨幣聯盟所需要的經濟治理大躍進。

 

In particular, we need to strengthen the surveillance of fiscal policies to prevent excessive deficits and unsustainable public debt with three main elements: shorter deadlines under excessive deficit procedures; quasi-automaticity in the application of sanctions, based on clearly defined criteria and with less discretion over outcomes; and ambitious targets for the reduction of public debt towards the 60% ceiling. 

尤其我們需要加強財政政策的監視,以防止過度的赤字和未能持續的政府債務水準,主要有三個要點:  縮短過度赤字程序規定的截止期限;適用制裁措施的半自動化,根據清楚定義的標準,減少對結果的裁量權;設定大膽的目標以減少政府債務水準至60%上限以內。

 

As regards the surveillance of macroeconomic policies in the euro area we need a new system of mutual surveillance, concentrating firmly on countries experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits as these countries face the greatest sustainability challenges. It should be determined by transparent and effective trigger mechanisms and specify clearly the sanctions in case of breach. And we need transparency. The assessments of macroeconomic imbalances and recommendations for corrective action should be given appropriate publicity at all stages of the surveillance process. 

關於歐元區的總體經濟政策的監視方面,我們需要一個新的相互監視系統,盯緊經歷競爭力持續流失和有鉅額經常帳赤字的國家,因為這些國家的經濟持續能力面臨最大挑戰。它應該以透明的和有效果的啟動機制來決定,且清楚地規定對違規者的罰則。我們也需要透明化。在監視程序的各個階段,對總體經濟失衡的評估,和改正措施的建議,應該適度地對外說明。

 

The effectiveness of these enhancements to the governance framework will in part be determined by the quality and independence of the economic analysis that underpins them. Without reliable statistical data we cannot be certain that the governance framework will provide the quantum leap forward that is necessary. It is therefore extremely important that the Commission services charged with conducting macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance for the euro area be sufficiently independent, ideally supported by a body of wise persons providing external assessments.

對治理架構的這些提昇措施的效果,將部份取決於它們所根據的經濟分析的品質和獨立性。沒有可靠的統計資料,我們無法確定治理架構將會提供我們所需的大躍進。因此,讓歐盟委員會主管歐元區總體經濟和財政監視的單位維持充份地獨立,這一點非常地重要,最理想的方式是由一組「智者」支援提供外部評估。

 

To be sure, the EU has already responded to one particular issue raised by the crisis, namely the need to co-ordinate macro-prudential oversight. You are all aware that the European Council and the European Parliament have recently finalised the decisions regarding the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board or ESRB, which I shall have the honour to chair. 

可以確定的是,歐盟已經對危機引起的一個特別議題作出回應,亦即有必要協調整合總體金融監管。我們都知道,歐盟理事會和歐盟議會最近已經決議,創設「歐盟系統風險委員會」,我很榮幸將兼任主席。

 

This new European body will be part of the new European System of Financial Supervision and its function will be to provide macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system. It will bring together the governors of the national central banks, the new European Supervisory Agencies, the Commission and the national supervisory authorities of all 27 member states. 

這個新的歐盟單位將會是「歐盟金融監理體系」的一部份,其功能將為提供歐盟金融體系總體金融監管。它將匯聚各國中央銀行總裁、新成立的「歐盟金融監理機構」、歐盟委員會、和全部27個會員國的金融監理主管當局。

 

The establishment of the ESRB was first recommended in February 2009 in the report of a high-level group chaired by Jacques de Larosière. The new institution is backed by a remarkably strong consensus between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. 

「歐盟系統風險委員會」的成立,最初係於20092月由Jacques de Larosière所主持的高階小組報告中所提議。新的機構背後有歐盟委員會、歐盟理事會、和歐盟議會強烈共識的支持。

 

The ECB will contribute to establishing the ESRB as a credible and effective body. Concretely, the ECB will host the Secretariat of the ESRB, thereby making it operational and providing analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support. 

歐洲中央銀行將協助建立「歐盟系統風險委員會」成為一個信譽卓著且有成效的單位。具體而言,歐洲中央銀行將提供「歐盟系統風險委員會」秘書處辦公場所,以便讓它能夠運作,並且提供分析、統計、後勤、和行政管理支援。

 

While the ESRB Secretariat will be located at the ECB, the ESRB will be a separate body, distinct from the ECB. The establishment of the ESRB will not affect the mandate and the functioning of the ECBs statutory role in monetary policy. 

雖然,「歐盟系統風險委員會」秘書處設於歐洲中央銀行,惟「歐盟系統風險委員會」將為獨立單位,不隸屬歐洲中央銀行。「歐盟系統風險委員會」的建立,將不會影響歐洲中央銀行在貨幣政策方面的法定地位的任務和運作。

 

The establishment of the ESRB will be a landmark event in how Europe deals preventively with systemic risk. It forms part of wider developments across the globe, including in the US with the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Very much like the ESRB, this council is a collaborative body bringing together the relevant US authorities with the aim of identifying systemic risk and responding to threats. We will aim for close cooperation with the FSOC and other authorities for macro-prudential oversight.

「歐盟系統風險委員會」的成立將會是歐盟在預防系統風險方面的一個里程碑。它構成全球各地更廣大演變的一部份,包括在美國新創立的「金融穩定監管委員會」。該委員會與「歐盟系統風險委員會」非常類似,都是協調合作的單位,目標為辨識系統風險和因應各種威脅。我們希望與「金融穩定監管委員會」和其他的主管當局密切合作執行總體金融監管。

 

Conclusion

結論

 

Let me draw to a close. The past 12 years have been very challenging. The ECB has, I trust, lived up to its responsibility and delivered what had been promised to our people: a stable currency, as credible and as inspiring of confidence as the best of the legacy currencies. The euro has also been a force for stability in what is now a more than three-year period of economic and financial instability.

讓我作一個結束。過去的12年非常具有挑戰性。我相信歐洲中央銀行有盡到它的職責,並且提供了對我們民眾所承諾的東西:穩定的貨幣,與舊有貨幣中最佳者同樣地可信賴和同樣地能夠激發信心。現在已經持續三年多的經濟和金融不穩定期間,歐元也成為一股穩定力量。

 

As in all major advanced economies, which, without exception, have had to review their economic models and surveillance frameworks, changes are needed in the euro area. These are not the kind of changes that push us towards more unilateral action, with the implicit dangers of lack of cooperation. Rather they are changes towards greater cooperation and greater cohesion through a strengthened framework of economic governance. We must keep our sense of direction: towards more European unity and more responsible European unity.

如同所有的主要先進經濟體,沒有例外,都必須檢討它們的經濟模型和監理架構。歐元區需要改變。這些改變不是要把我們推向比較片面行動的那一類,隱含有缺乏合作的危險。而是透過強化的經濟治理架構,朝向更多的合作和更具凝聚力的那類改變。我們必須保持我們的方向感:朝向歐盟的更團結,且為更有責任感的歐盟團結。

 

Thank you for your attention.

謝謝你們的注意。